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ARTICLE
AGENCY COORDINATION OF




This Article explores the previously overlooked role of relational con-
tracting in forming and maintaining public-private partnerships. Relational
contracting generally describes firms using formal but legally non-binding
agreements to collaborate on shared objectives. Why do parties invest in form-
ing elaborate contracts that they do not—and cannot—enforce in court? Con-
tract theory suggests that the very act of contracting is relationship-building; it
generates commitment, trust, cooperation, a win-win philosophy, and
strengthened communication. Writing down goals and intentions allows par-
ties to clarify expectations while maintaining flexibility for unforeseen condi-
tions. This Article demonstrates that agencies also use relational contracting—
creating unenforceable written agreements to build relationships with external
actors.
To shed light on agencies’ use of relational contracting, this Article provides
a novel review of the recovery planning process required by the Endangered
Species Act. A surprising finding emerges: private groups are providing cru-
cial resources and logistical support to prevent the extinction of endangered
species. Tribes, states, nongovernmental organizations, and sportsmen’s
groups are providing necessary resources to further agency action. By orches-
trating private action through recovery planning documents, the agency can
garner the resources necessary to undertake species translocations, which it
could not unilaterally facilitate. Although the plans are not judicially enforcea-
ble, they nevertheless play a coordinating and commitment-generating role in
facilitating private actors to engage in recovery efforts. This example high-
lights the broader trend of relational contracting building and formalizing re-
lationships between agency and non-agency actors.
Environmental impact statements, forest management plans, and recovery
plans for endangered species are all examples of such “relational contracts”
governing inter-agency and private-public collaborations. Viewed in this light,
seemingly prosaic planning documents are, in fact, a crucial component in
facilitating many agency collaborations. Descriptively, this account adds insti-
tutional detail to literatures on new governance and public-private partner-
ships. Normatively, it raises questions about whether the benefits of
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contracting offsets the potential distributional inequities and mechanisms to
shroud government actions created by the practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
By now, it is old news that agencies collaborate with private actors
to achieve shared regulatory objectives.1 Agencies tend to coordinate
private action through goal-setting, persuasion, and coordinating ef-
forts, rather than heavy-hand statutory enforcement.2 The cooperative
nature of the process allows agencies to skirt challenges to their au-
thority—such as takings challenges—and avoid legal controversy by
1. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 129 (2013) (arguing that private action plays a large, perhaps even primary, role
in advancing modern environmental objectives); Allyson Barker et al., The Role of
Collaborative Groups in Federal Land and Resource Management: A Legal Analysis,
23 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 67 (2003) (noting the role of collaborative
groups in public land management); Robert A. Kagan, Political and Legal Obstacles
to Collaborative Ecosystem Planning, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 871 (1997) (discussing com-
plications with collaborative attempts within the context of ecosystem management);
Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning and Adaptive Management in Glen
Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2–3 (2010) (providing a case
study of collaboration); Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Cul-
ture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515 (2013) (documenting public-private approaches
to forest management as early as 1920); Karen Bradshaw & Dean Lueck, Contracting
for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (suggesting
that landscape-level resources that span many parcels necessitate coordination among
landowners, including public and private land managers); Alejandro Esteban Cama-
cho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality,
Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment
One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 56–65 (2005) (analyzing the role of stakeholders in land
use decisions); Cameron Holley, Removing the Thorn from New Governance’s Side:
Examining the Emergence of Collaboration in Practice and the Role for Law, Nested
Institutions, and Trust, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10656 (2010) (evaluating the conditions
necessary for collaboration).
2. See infra Part II.B.
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facilitating ex ante negotiation.3 Yet agency-led private action provides
increased accountability and oversight relative to purely private
solutions.
Voluntary private action plays a large role in achieving environmen-
tal objectives once framed as purely public domain.4 The intersection
of public and private approaches involves agencies contracting with
private environmentalists and coordinating for desired outcomes,
rather than relying upon adjudicatory or rulemaking proceedings.5 Yet
the details of how, precisely, this occurs remains relatively
understudied.
The presently incomplete institutional account of public-private co-
ordination leads to two interrelated problems. First, it risks overre-
liance on traditional tools of positive law or naı¨ve trust in purely
private governance to address emerging challenges. Scholars and com-
mentators have failed to appreciate the interaction between new tools
like collaborative planning documents and more familiar tools, like
agency rulemaking and adjudication.6 Second, the mechanisms
through which public-private collaboration take place are both under-
studied and sometimes intentionally shrouded from the public.7 As a
result, the nuts-and-bolts mechanisms that link agency action and pri-
vate environmentalism are relatively unknown. This informational
void exacerbates the inability of policymakers to respond to the ef-
fects of law on private practices.
What, then, is the role of government in achieving environmental
aims? In the 1970s, Congress enacted a sweeping series of federal en-
vironmental statutes.8 The resulting body of federal environmental
law created vast authority for federal agency action on a multitude of
objectives.9 The Supreme Court largely upheld these laws and the re-
sultant agency action.10 Over time, many agencies capitulated to in-
dustrial pressures and regulated less frequently and less strongly than
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 129 (noting that environmental preferences are R
expressed through private interactions in social settings and the marketplace, not just
the political process).
5. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54
DUKE L.J. 795, 797–98 (2005).
6. Vandenbergh, supra note 1. R
7. Karen Bradshaw, Settling for Natural Resource Damages, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 211 (2016) [hereinafter Bradshaw, Settling] (noting that $10.4 billion in settle-
ments paid to the government by responsible parties for natural resource damages to
public trust resources is governed by contracts, the basis of which are shielded from
the public).
8. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the
United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 75, 77–82 (2001).
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (providing the first
Supreme Court decision on the Endangered Species Act, in which the court noted
that it would uphold environmental legislation even if it produced “absurd” results).
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statutes mandated. Meanwhile, the public’s attention shifted away
from the environmental problems that prompted the laws, reducing
public oversight of agency implementation.11 Congress took its last
major action on environmental policy in 1990, over twenty-five years
ago.12 In the void of congressional action, agency action13 and private
action14 have emerged as key tools for addressing new environmental
problems.
Private actors are well-poised to achieve environmental progress.15
Landowners have vast stores of land-specific information, and private
property rights control most American lands.16 Companies have finan-
cial resources that dwarf agency budgets and expertise. Nongovern-
mental organizations are at the forefront of scientific and social
innovation in collaborative best practices. Environmentalists, industry
leaders, landowners, and nongovernmental organizations can leverage
their specialized knowledge to advance or undermine various environ-
mental objectives. Industry leaders can apply this knowledge to vari-
ous areas, including profit maximization and environmental
preservation. Nongovernmental organizations and landowners can act
without the costly, time-consuming burdens of procedure and
democracy.17
A core value proposition for agency involvement in environmental
objectives rests in the government’s unique ability to coordinate and
channel resources toward important public objectives. Although vari-
ous environmental nongovernmental organizations have expertise,
control, money, and credibility, few private organizations have all of
these attributes.18 Government continues to play a vital role in even
11. Lazarus, supra note 8, at 82–84. R
12. Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 PA. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2014).
13. Id. at 19.
14. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 140–41. R
15. Eric W. Orts & Cary Coglianese, Collaborative Environmental Law: Pro and
Con, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 289, 290–94 (2007) (noting that collaborative
environmental governance offers flexibility and nimbleness relative to other govern-
ance approaches).
16. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-
Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015) (describing that most American lands
are held by private landowners who coordinate with public landowners to govern
landscape-level resources that exceed individual parcel sizes).
17. Guy Mundlak & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Signaling Virtue? A Comparison of Corporate
Codes in the Fields of Labor and Environment, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 603,
606–07 (2011); Haitao Yin, Howard Kunreuther, & Matthew W. White, Risk-Based
Pricing and Risk-Reducing Effort: Does the Private Insurance Market Reduce Envi-
ronmental Accidents?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 325 (2011) (describing the superiority of pri-
vate regulatory practices to govern environmental risk traditionally controlled by
agency regulation and enforcement).
18. Private synergies often emerge, as with the Sierra Club working with Clorox to
improve chemical formulations of its products. GreenBiz Editors, Clorox and Sierra
Club Announce Branding Partnership, GREEN BIZ (Jan. 13, 2008, 5:00 PM), https://
www.greenbiz.com/news/2008/01/13/clorox-and-sierra-club-announce-branding-part
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“private” action in at least two ways: First, government orchestration
of private environmentalism focuses efforts toward objectives that re-
flect democratic concerns. Second, the threat of legislation or regula-
tion prompts industry to undertake preemptive steps to improve
practices.
Government involvement also offers the imprimatur of legitimacy
derived from the singular, non-duplicable nature of democratic gov-
ernment. Government-led action escapes the downfall of many pri-
vate environmentalists in that it cannot be imitated by look-alike
organizations, unlike certifications, brands, or the corporate or non-
profit forms associated with corporations and nongovernmental orga-
nizations alike.19 There are, of course, levels of government (local,
state, federal, and international), but the authority of each is clearly
delineated by law. Although imperfect, state and federal governments
alike are backstopped by the democratic process. Government offers
a singularity of form, which private structures cannot duplicate. Ac-
cordingly, despite enthusiasm for private efforts in environmental law,
it is difficult to seriously suggest that government plays no role in
achieving outcomes.
The question in crafting sensible intersections of public and private
environmental action is how to leverage the inevitable mix of compe-
tencies and limitations to achieve the best outcome. For years, agen-
cies have quietly capitalized on private resources to achieve public
objectives.20 In fact, agency cooperation with private actors is key to
obtaining several important objectives. Over one dozen agencies rely
on thousands of collaborations nationally.21 The remainder of this Ar-
ticle shows that relational contracting plays a key, largely underap-
preciated role in achieving environmental objectives.22
This Article explores agencies’ use of relational contracting to en-
shrine commitments by private actors into their planning documents.
This allows the agency to leverage the capabilities of external actors,
such as nongovernmental organizations or industry groups, that share
an ideological commitment to the agency mandate.23 External actors
voluntarily provide funding or undertake action in support of an
nership [https://perma.cc/FU4Y-BYDA]. Industries sometimes seek different corpo-
rate forms to achieve other attributes (as with the timber industry creating a nongov-
ernmental organization, SFI, to create a credible certification regime). SFI Strategic
Vision, SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE INDUS., http://www.sfiprogram.org/about
-us/sfi-strategic-vision/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8B3F-DFSB].
19. Karen Bradshaw, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755 (2015) (noting
that companies create look-alike certifications to fool consumers).
20. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
593 (2000).
21. KAREN BRADSHAW, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE USE OF STAKE-
HOLDER COLLABORATIONS IN PUBLIC LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT (2017) [hereinafter BRADSHAW, STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATIONS].
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.
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agency mandate. Relational contracting differs from traditional con-
tracting, in which agencies hire nongovernmental actors to act. Rela-
tional contracting instead relies upon longstanding, collaborative
relationships.
Specifically, this Article reflects observations derived from a novel
review of all 138 species translocations that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (“the FWS” or “the Agency”) has undertaken. I oversaw a
team of research assistants in constructing a database of translocation
by reviewing all 597 recovery plans for threatened and endangered
species generated from 2004–2014.24 This longitudinal review of the
recovery planning process yields new insights into how agencies are
working with private actors to facilitate species recovery under the
Endangered Species Act.
Notably, private organizations are heavily involved in many translo-
cation decisions. Companies, nongovernmental organizations, tribes,
and local governments play key roles in species recovery efforts—ef-
forts that have not been previously identified in a systematic way.
Conventional wisdom around recovery planning and species translo-
cations focuses almost entirely on agency actions. In practice, this Ar-
ticle demonstrates that private actors are playing a surprising large
role in translocations.
This account adds to a growing literature demonstrating agencies’
reliance on non-traditional tools to satisfy statutory mandates. It tells
a new story about agencies’ response to private governance, namely
adapting to chart new and creative ways to pursue their mandates.
Under this narrative, agencies are not necessarily being displaced by
nimbler external actors but may instead be leveraging private action
as a mechanism to reduce the political and fiscal costs of satisfying
agency mandates under the radar of controversy.25 Agency involve-
ment in what might otherwise be purely private realms serves as a
monitor on private action to check against irresponsible, unilateral
action.
Agencies’ practice of outsourcing portions of their mandates to ex-
ternal actors is not universally viewed as a positive.26 Private action
lacks the public processes and inclusiveness traditionally embedded
24. See infra Appendix I for a description of how I constructed this database.
25. Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 211, 275–77 (2015) (dis-
cussing the efficiencies that accrue from pooling among agencies, including “flexibil-
ity, shared learning, and collaborative innovation”).
26. Highlighting these concerns, a groundswell of litigation is working its way
through circuit courts of appeals, with parties questioning agencies’ leveraging action
by private parties to sidestep the costs and controversy of traditional processes. Cases
challenging agency collaboration with private parties are before the District of Co-
lumbia and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. These cases will likely be appealed to the
Supreme Court, which may consider the broader question of whether agencies may
outsource portions of their mandate to external actors. For a discussion of this litiga-
tion, see infra Part III.
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into the administrative states. Stakeholders who bear the costs of ac-
tions may be excluded from decision-making. Agencies’ circumven-
tion of democratic processes may functionally shield controversial
actions that should be subject to robust public debate. External actors
also create a new layer of redundancy in governance,27 which may
provide a new form of review that serves to offset concerns about
democratic accountability.28
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes relational con-
tracting and outlines two brief examples of agencies’ use of relational
contracting to facilitate collaboration. Part II presents a case study of
the FWS embedding private commitments in endangered species re-
covery plans, which are statutorily required but legally non-binding.29
The Agency appears to be using the trust-building aspects of rela-
tional contracting to mitigate controversy that would otherwise derail
conservation objectives.30 The specific role of contracting appears to
create surprising levels of coordinated and voluntary private action to
conserve wildlife.31 Detailed study of these documents yields a sur-
prising insight: much of the action undertaken in species translocation
is funded and managed by non-Agency actors. In fact, the Agency
seems to only play a coordinating and monitoring role. Part III of this
Article analyzes the benefits of relational contracting in forming pub-
lic-private relationships. Such contracting can, however, be used to
shroud agency action from public scrutiny. Furthermore, contracting
can serve to lock out non-parties to a contract, even if they have a
stake in the outcome of the contract. This issue highlights the need for
case-by-case assessment of the role of relational contracting in estab-
lishing collaborative arrangements. Not all contracts, nor collabora-
tions, serve the public interest. Part IV briefly concludes.
27. Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and
Overlap, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346, 346–48 (1969) (explaining that redundancy is gen-
erally thought of negatively); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and
Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1463 (2011) (“[I]nstitutional designers
sometimes seek contributions from multiple agents by designing systems with built-in
institutional overlap or redundancy.”).
28. Freeman, supra note 20, at 549 (proposing “‘aggregate’ accountability: a mix R
of formal and informal mechanisms, emanating not just from government supervision,
but from independent third parties and regulated entities themselves [to] allay our
concerns about the particular risks posed by arrangements of public and private ac-
tors, while capitalizing on their capacities”).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.; infra Part I.
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II. RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Relational contracting describes how firms use trust-based agree-
ments, without the potential for judicial enforcement,32 to coordinate
private action on regulatory goals.33 The term “relational contracting”
derives from robust law and economic literature on contract theory.34
This literature documents firms that rely on relational contracting to
facilitate partnerships, alliances, joint ventures, and risk sharing.35
Scholars credit this practice with breeding commitment and trust. The
practice is credited with increasing cooperation and communication,
leading parties to identify common goals and objectives, and infusing
negotiations with a win-win philosophy.36 It is particularly useful in
situations that are ambiguous, uncertain, or that involve currently un-
known future events.37
Until now, scholarly discussion of relational contracting has focused
on firm-to-firm relationships. Yet relational contracting plays a crucial
role in forming and maintaining inter-agency and public-private col-
laborations. Planning documents, memoranda of understanding, and
even some consent decrees function as relational contacts. When
agencies secure private commitments, the potential exists to bring
potential adversaries to the table as partners to achieve a shared
goal.38 This non-adversarial approach serves to marshal resources and
create public-private synergies—the very heart of collaborative
governance.39
32. Victor P. Goldberg, Lawyers Asleep at the Wheel? The GM–Fisher Body Con-
tract, 17 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1071, 1076–80 (2008) (showing that the General
Motors–Fisher Body supply contract was legally unenforceable).
33. See generally Iva Bozovic & Gillian K. Hadfield, Scaffolding: Using Formal
Contracts to Build Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV.
981. Examples of such documents include agency planning documents (e.g., Forest
Plans, species recovery plans), memoranda of understanding, and consent decrees.
34. Relational contracting theory suggests that informal agreements that are not
legally enforceable nonetheless play an important role among long-term repeat trans-
actors operating under conditions of uncertainty. Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Con-
tract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 506, 559, 561, 566 (2015).
35. John F.Y. Yeung et al., Defining Relational Contracting from the Wittgenstein
Family-Resemblance Philosophy, 30 INT’L J. PROJECT MGMT. 225, 227 (2012).
36. Id. at 230.
37. Robert J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 437, 454 (2009).
38. Planning’s reliance on a mix of public and private actors is consistent with
approaches that emphasize the role of multiple actors in developing and implement-
ing administrative policies. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) (anticipating the role of both “external constituencies” and
“internal staff of the agencies” as competing with the President, Congress, and Judici-
ary for control of administrative policies); Freeman, supra note 20, at 548 (proposing a R
conception “of decision-making [ ] that depends on combinations of public and pri-
vate actors linked by implicit or explicit agreements”).
39. See infra Part II.A.
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Agencies’ role in relational contracting varies according to context.
Below are two real-world examples highlighting agencies’ use of rela-
tional contracting.
A. Example 1: Natural Resource Damages
Agencies are statutorily required to pursue natural resource dam-
ages from companies and individuals who harm public trust re-
sources.40 This unique category of damages can only be pursued by
the government and can only be spent to restore the damaged re-
sources. These damages are not a fine or penalty but are, instead, de-
signed to “make the public whole” for resources lost, such as marine
life lost through an oil spill.41
Virtually all natural resource damages cases settle. Yet, the settle-
ment process often takes years—even decades—for certain categories
of cases.42 Scientists first must assess the damage; then, economists
assign a dollar value to it. Only then can the parties begin to negotiate
a settlement amount. Both the potentially responsible party
(tortfeasor) and the agency stand to benefit from coordinating the as-
sessment process in a variety of ways.43 Thus, these potentially adver-
sarial parties have reason and incentive to collaborate closely
throughout the process. Moreover, several federal agencies, states,
and tribes may act collectively to pursue a claim—introducing still an-
other layer of collaboration.44 After reviewing hundreds of natural re-
source damages cases and interviewing dozens of practitioners
operating in this field,45 it is clear that relational contracting plays a
crucial role in the settlement process.
To provide one example of early, foundation-setting contracting,
consider the role of the Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). In
some cases, a lead agency may generate an MOU to formalize an ini-
tial expectation of cooperation among states, tribes, federal agencies,
and a private party. The MOU is sometimes generated within mere
hours of the damage-causing incident. The MOU is not legally en-
forceable. Any party may decide to change to an adversarial, instead
of collaborative, relationship at any point in the process. But, creating
an MOU “sets the tone” for the years of coordination between par-
ties. It formalizes expectations so that a break from collaboration
would be an obvious departure from agreed-to expectations. And, it
finds a low-stake level of agreement that is the first in a series of in-
creasingly higher-stake decisions that the parties will reach. Over
time, the parties enter into a variety of increasingly complex written
40. Bradshaw, Settling, supra note 7, at 217–19. R
41. Id. at 213.
42. Id. at 240.
43. Id. at 243–44.
44. Id. at 230–31.
45. Id. at 232–34.
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agreements, each building upon previous agreements. Ultimately, the
process culminates in a settlement—reachable largely in part because
the parties have formed a years-long relationship that allows compro-
mise over the shared objective of restoring natural resources.
B. Example 2: Stakeholder Collaborations
Federal land management agencies, such as the Forest Service, rely
heavily on stakeholder collaborations to incorporate local perspec-
tives into land management decisions. In this context, the land man-
agement agency coordinates contracting (and collaboration) between
other parties, even when the agency itself is not a party to the collabo-
ration. Such collaborations generally begin with low-stake agreements
that are unrelated to the contentious substantive issues.46 Stakeholder
charters, ground rules for meetings, and MOUs between the collabo-
ration and agency are examples of such scaffolding documents.47
These kinds of documents create repeated face-to-face interaction be-
tween parties, which can serve to build trust and relationships. The
process of creating these written agreements is more important than
their content.
After a foundation of trust is established (a process that generally
takes years), the group shifts to substantive issues.48 Agency planning
documents, such as environmental impact statements, can be used to
guide discussion. Stakeholder groups gain a sense of importance by
contributing to formal agency documents because their work and in-
put helps guide agency action. A statutorily-required document out-
lining future agency action provides a focal point that forces
stakeholders to the table. Stakeholders either participate in the collab-
orative planning process or forego their interests in the outcome.
The imprimatur of government facilitates such bargaining between
adversaries by providing a neutral forum for parties to bargain with-
out foregoing ideological commitments. Disagreeing stakeholders
hash out conflicts directly, negotiating to reach a mutually acceptable
outcome. The agency generally incorporates the end-product of stake-
holder collaboration into the planning document. Thus, the draft plan-
ning document already reflects the outcome negotiated by key
stakeholders. It is also more likely to generate community acceptance
and less likely to be litigated.
These documents provide a moral, if not legally-enforceable, set of
shared expectations.49 The very process of relational contracting ap-
pears to play a vital role in the formation and maintenance of public-
46. BRADSHAW, STAKEHOLDER COLLABORATIONS, supra note 21, at 4. R
47. See id. at 93.
48. Id. at 46.
49. See infra Part III.
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private collaboration.50 This process allows parties with differing in-
terests to coordinate resources on shared objectives.
These two examples provide a brief insight into how agencies might
use contracting to facilitate collaboration that achieves substantive
aims. Having made the point that relational contracting is widespread
and varied, this Article now turns to a concentrated exploration of its
application in a particular context.
III. CASE STUDY: RELATIONAL CONTRACTING TO HELP
ENDANGERED SPECIES
This Section focuses on agencies’ use of collaborative processes to
achieve environmental objectives. Collaborative adaptive manage-
ment provides flexibility in adapting to changed conditions that laws
and regulations do not. It further allows agencies iterative opportuni-
ties to assess and navigate stakeholder controversy. Although agencies
are praised for the recognizable end-product of regulation, the less
definitive process of planning and implementing a plan spurs volun-
tary private action on objectives. Unlike purely private action, collab-
orative governance maintains a role for government, which ensures
transparency and lends credibility and accountability to private
efforts.51
Relational contracting is a major contributor to agency success in
carrying out environmental objectives, as evidenced by a case study of
the FWS embedding commitments for private action into endangered
species recovery plans. This Section first discusses the statutory back-
drop of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or the “Act”) as con-
trasted with takings concerns. It also shows that the FWS becomes
bogged down with legal challenges by attempting to carry out statu-
tory mandates. Surprisingly, the Agency has nevertheless made signifi-
cant progress on its mandates to administer the Act. This Section
suggests that collaboration leading to embedded commitments in
planning documents is the mechanism that the Agency relies upon to
prompt private contributions necessary to carry out controversial
50. See infra Part III.
51. Much of this discussion has occurred among international law scholars, includ-
ing Kenneth Abbot and Duncan Snidal, who have coined the term “orchestration” to
describe government entities encouraging private action. Orchestration is one form of
new governance, in which public actors coordinate a mix of public and private activ-
ity. See THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester
M. Salamon ed., 2002); Kenneth W. Abbot & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening Interna-
tional Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orches-
tration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 505–06 (2008) (noting that new
governance regulatory initiatives are distinctive because external actors play a “cen-
tral role” and that private institutions operate on a “voluntary rather than state-man-
dated” basis); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 70–71 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (discuss-
ing public-private governance arrangements).
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objectives. Through embedding private commitments into planning
documents, agencies achieve far more than they could by acting uni-
laterally, while also retaining more control than a purely private
model affords.
Showing that relational contracting yields environmental progress
uncovers at least two consequences. First, it shows that public-private
interactions are more bi-directional and inclusive than traditional
principal-agent models recognized. Second, it challenges the pre-
sumed efficacy of regulation in at least two ways: (1) it shows that
regulations alone are relatively inflexible and expensive to defend;
and (2) it demonstrates that more collaborative approaches are being
used in practice to yield results that agencies could not require
through regulation.
A. Political Economy of the Endangered Species Act
In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA, tasking the FWS and National
Marine Fisheries with recovering threatened and endangered species
that would otherwise become extinct.52 Despite the perceived strength
of the law,53 administration of the Act was quickly bogged down in
controversy. Industry, private landowners, and states opposed federal
controls on private lands and were effective in doing so.54 Nongovern-
mental organizations sued the FWS, claiming inadequate agency ac-
tion in listing imperiled species.55 The Agency’s timing and outcomes
of species listings56 for critical habitat designations57 were subject to
52. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1543 (2012). Two federal agen-
cies, the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service, share re-
sponsibility for administering for the Endangered Species Act. This Article focuses on
the Fish and Wildlife Service, which manages more than 95% of listed species. Daniel
M. Evans et al., Species Recovery in the United States: Increasing the Effectiveness of
the Endangered Species Act, ISSUES ECOLOGY, Winter, 2016, at 1, 11 (noting that
“NMFS manages fewer than 5 percent of all listed species”).
53. The Act was soon considered one of the most powerful federal statutory re-
gimes in the United States. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(upholding the unprecedented level of authority in the Endangered Species Act and
the agencies administering it).
54. Martin B. Main et al., Evaluating Costs of Conservation, 13 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 1262, 1265 (1999) (noting that “[l]andowners fear a decline in the value of
their properties because the ESA restricts future land-use options”); James Salzman,
Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 340–42 (1990) (describing that communities and land-
owners near areas designated as critical habitat believe they bear a disproportionate
burden of the cost for a societal good of species preservation). A recent empirical
study showed that these concerns are largely unfounded; property values in fact tend
to increase after an endangered species is listed in the area.
55. See JASON SHOGREN & JOHN TSCHIRHART, PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPE-
CIES IN THE UNITED STATES: BIOLOGICAL NEEDS, POLITICAL REALITIES, ECONOMIC
CHOICES (2001); Sayeed Mehmood & Daowei Zhang, A Roll Call Analysis of the
Endangered Species Act Amendments, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 501 (2001).
56. R. Patrick Rawls & David N. Laband, A Public Choice Analysis of Endan-
gered Species Listings, 121 PUB. CHOICE 263, 264–65 (2004) (describing listing of spe-
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political factors. In response to opposition, Congress has amended the
Act several times.58 The FWS has come to rely on practices that rein-
force its role as an orchestrator to advance its objectives from both
landowners and nongovernmental organizations.59
The ESA reads as a roadmap for an agency overcoming public op-
position through partnering with potential opponents.60 To provide a
few examples, the Habitat Conservation Process essentially exchanges
money paid to private mitigation banks in exchange for incidental
take permits, which essentially grant permission to kill species.61 Safe
harbor agreements exchange agency promises not to increase land
regulation for landowner protection of endangered species.62 Land-
owners are paid and granted regulatory certainty for providing proac-
tive conservation measures for species that might be eventually listed
through candidate conservation agreements and conservation bank-
ing.63 Collectively, by using tools to engage private partners, the FWS
cies as less likely if the habitat of the species overlaps with the district of a member of
the U.S. House of Representative budget subcommittee, which provides oversight for
the funding of the Fish and Wildlife Service).
57. Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to Be Protected Under the Endangered Spe-
cies Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & ECON. 29, 30 (1999)
(noting that the timing of listing decisions correlates to interest group pressure).
58. Empirical studies in economics literature suggest that politics has more to do
with endangered species recovery decisions than scientific considerations. David W.
Cash, Beyond Cute and Fuzzy: Science and Politics in the U.S. Endangered Species
Act, in PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 106, 111–12, 130
(Jason F. Shogren & John Tschirhart eds., 2001) (finding the amount of funding desig-
nated to endangered species recovery “is correlated less with scientifically based con-
siderations of endangerment and correlated more with a variety of political
considerations” including economic conflict, media coverage, and public comments).
59. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, The Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J.
50, 62 (2001) (noting that agencies “seek out any flexibility the statute allows, and
exploit it to deflect controversy”); Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and
Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 277, 279 (1993) (noting that the regulatory discretion afforded to the Fish and
Wildlife Service has allowed “the ESA [to accommodate] the overwhelming majority
of human activity without impediment”); Marcilyn Burke, Klamath Farmers and Cap-
puccino Cowboys: The Rhetoric of the Endangered Species Act and Why It (Still) Mat-
ters, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 441, 453 (2004) (discussing how Secretary Bruce
Babbit used section 10 of the ESA, which allows private individuals to submit habitat
conservation plans in order to engage in activities that would otherwise be in violation
of the ESA, to “balance the interests of the species and the landowners”).
60. Of course, private efforts exist outside the auspices of federal control, as well.
State efforts can eclipse federal protections, as with Florida’s robust species protec-
tion program, which has generated more than $33 million in private contributions.
Evans et al., supra note 52, at 13.
61. Id. at 15 (noting that “[b]y the end of 2012, FWS had approved more than 650
HCPs covering 85.5 million acres and several hundred species”).
62. Id. (noting that “[b]y the end of 2012, FWS had approved more than 70 SHAs
covering 4.4 million acres and 213 miles of aquatic habitat”).
63. Candidate conservation species are those which have been proposed for listing
and meet the substantive criteria to support a listing, but are precluded from listing by
higher priority listing actions. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 79
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has benefitted hundreds of species and protected over 90 million acres
of habitat.64
Section Four of the ESA requires the FWS to develop a recovery
plan outlining specific actions designed to restore populations of
threatened and endangered species.65 Recovery plans incorporate a
variety of adaptive responses to climate change to save plants, wild-
life, birds, and fish that might otherwise become extinct.66 This some-
times includes species translocation—moving species from its
indigenous habitat to another habitat in which it does not naturally
occur.67
Fed. Reg. 72,451 (Dec. 5, 2014) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223 (2018)) (noting that Fish
and Wildlife Service “offer[s] technical and financial assistance to facilitate [conserva-
tion] efforts [for candidate species]”); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,481 (Dec. 5, 1996) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (2018)).
64. See infra Part II.B. Regulation and informal practices further the reach of
orchestration. This number of acres of habitat conserved, for example, grows when
one considers agencies’ informal partnerships, such as working with nongovernmental
organizations, such as land trusts, to identify and protect habitat. See, e.g., Federico
Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers Should Know (and
Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation Transactions, 34
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,223, 10,223 (Mar. 2004).
65. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 4, 87 Stat. 884,
886–87 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012)).
66. Jessica Kabaz-Gomez, Note, Rules for Playing God: The Need for Assisted Mi-
gration and New Regulation, 19 ANIMAL L. 111, 125–28 (2012) (“[I]nternational orga-
nizations and U.S. government agencies that are involved in species conservation are
increasingly recommending assisted migration as a climate change adaptation
strategy.”).
67. A non-exhaustive list of law review articles discussing species translocation
includes: Karrigan Bork, Listed Species Reintroductions on Private Land-Limiting
Landowner Liability, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 177, 183–85 (2011); Alejandro Camacho,
Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law Under Climate
Change, 27 YALE J. REG. 171 (2010) (discussing the legal and ethical issues of human
interference to natural resources through assisted migration); Federico Cheever,
From Population Segregation to Species Zoning: The Evolution of Reintroduction Law
Under Section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act, 1 WYO. L. REV. 287 (2001); Holly
Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species]; Rob-
ert L. Glickman, Ecosystem Resilience to Disruptions Linked to Global Climate
Change: An Adaptive Approach to Federal Land Management, 87 NEB. L. REV. 833
(2009) (discussing assisted migration, reintroduction of species, and wildlife highways
as adaptive solutions to climate change); John D. Leshy, Federal Lands in the Twenty-
First Century, 50 NAT. RESOURCE J. 111 (2010); Nicole R. Matthews, Who Is the
Predator and Who Is the Prey? The Endangered Species Act and the Reintroduction of
Predator Species Into the Wild, 6 ENVTL. L. 183 (1999); J.B. Ruhl, Assisted Coloniza-
tion: Facilitate Migration First, 330 SCIENCE 1317 (2010); Daniel Schramm & Akiva
Fishman, Legal Frameworks for Adaptive Natural Resource Management in a Chang-
ing Climate, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 491, 493 (2010) (noting that climate
change is projected to have a deleterious impact on a significant number of species
previously thought to be “‘immune’ to extinction risk”); Kabaz-Gomez, supra note
66, at 125–28 (“[I]nternational organizations and U.S. government agencies that are
involved in species conservation are increasingly recommending assisted migration as
a climate change adaptation strategy.”). For a database consisting of thousands of
interdisciplinary scholarly articles about translocations from 1970–1996, see Brad
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Prior to translocating a species, the Secretary of the Interior must
issue a regulation identifying the population and determining whether
the population is essential to the continued existence of an endan-
gered or threatened species.68 The FWS has produced guidelines out-
lining criteria to guide translocation decisions.69 Courts have widely
upheld the Agency’s translocation authority and have afforded them
considerable discretion in doing so.70 Yet translocations (like most re-
covery actions) are discretionary—meaning that agencies do not have
to undertake them—even if they are written into recovery plans.
Many proposed translocations are derailed by private opposition.71
Griffith et al., Annotated Biography of Wildlife Translocations, INST. ARTIC BIOLOGY,
http://www.iab.uaf.edu/people/brad_griffith/translocation.html (last visited Jan. 29,
2018) [https://perma.cc/LR35-RG34] (listing topics as divided by birds, mammals, rep-
tiles and amphibians, general topics, index, and late-1989 through early 1996). For a
database of more recent scholarly articles from a variety of academic disciplines, see
Assisted Migration (Assisted Colonization, Managed Relocation, Translocation) and
Rewilding of Plants and Animals in an Era of Rapid Climate Change, TORREYA
GUARDIANS, http://www.torreyaguardians.org/assisted-migration.html#forestry (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017) [https://perma.cc/3ZLV-GVET] (listing over one hundred arti-
cles about species relocations).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(j)(2)(B) (2012).
69.  See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species: Designation of a Nonessential
Experimental Population of Central Valley Spring-Run Chinook Salmon Below Fri-
ant Dam in the San Joaquin River, CA, 78 Fed. Reg. 79,622, 79,623 (Dec. 13, 2013)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223) (noting that the Fish and Wildlife Service has regula-
tions guiding how to make the required determinations under Section 10(j)). The Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service has not promulgated translocation guidelines, relying
instead on the Fish and Wildlife Service’s guidelines when making translocation deci-
sions. See id. (noting that “while [the National Marine Fisheries Service does] not
have regulations governing the designation of experimental populations, [it] consid-
ered [Fish and Wildlife Service] regulations”).
70. Wyo. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 199 F.3d 1224, 1241 (10th Cir. 2000) (up-
holding a Fish and Wildlife Service decision to reintroduce wolves over the objections
of ranchers concerned about wolves preying upon their livestock); United States v.
McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998).
71. Local opposition and funding limitations regularly constrained agency activi-
ties. Translocations of Black Footed Ferrets (Mustela nigripes), 61 Fed. Reg. 11,320,
11,321 (Mar. 20, 1996) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“[L]ocal citizens often opposed
reintroduction because they were concerned about restrictions and prohibitions on
Federal and private activities. This opposition severely handicapped the effectiveness
of reintroduction as a management tool.”); Translocation of Red Wolves (Canis ru-
fus), 51 Fed. Reg. 41,790, 41,790 (Nov. 19, 1986) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“Local
opposition to reintroduction efforts, however, stemming from concerns about the re-
strictions and prohibitions on private and Federal activities contained in sections 7
and 9 of the Act, severely handicapped the effectiveness of this as a management
tool.”); Stephen M. Meyer, Community Politics and Endangered Species Protection, in
PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES 138, 142 (Jason F.
Shogren & John Tschirhart eds., 2001) (noting that, with respect to U.S. biodiversity
policy “[t]raditional interest group politics [between economic and environmental in-
terests] would describe well what we have seen for the past decade or so.”); Clifford
Nowell, On Political Realities: Comments on Ando, Cash, and Meyer, in PROTECTING
ENDANGERED SPECIES IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 166, 167 (noting that the
“exact same issues raised by Meyer” with regard to interest groups “will determine
the success of the ESA”).
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Resource-constrained72 government agencies carry out transloca-
tion and must decide which species’ survival to prioritize.73 The FWS’s
ability to satisfy its statutory mandate under the Act is circumscribed
by opposition. Yet the Agency faces public74 and legal75 pressure to
undertake such recovery efforts. Below, the Article discusses how the
FWS is relying upon private action coordinated through relational
contracting to overcome this polarized situation.
B. Spurring Private Action
I worked with a team of research assistants to search for the recov-
ery plans for all 597 endangered species.76 The FWS identified translo-
cation as an ecologically necessary recovery strategy for 138
threatened or endangered species. The team reviewed each of these
recovery plans to identify whether translocation(s) had occurred and
whether non-Agency actors were included in the recovery plan. Sixty-
five translocations have occurred; seventy proposed translocations
have not occurred.77 In three instances, it is unclear whether the trans-
location occurred.
Research assistants identified portions of the recovery plan in which
non-Agency actors—including tribes, states, cities, and environmental
nongovernmental organizations—are playing a crucial role in species
recovery. This review yielded that private actors are playing key roles
in translocations. The below figure reflects the non-Agency actors
whose involvement is incorporated into the recovery planning process.
72. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 1455, 1491 (2011) (noting that natural resource managers are “typically re-
source-limited, understaffed, and overcommitted”) [hereinafter Doremus, Adaptive
Management].
73.  See Andrew Metrick & Martin L. Weitzman, Patterns of Behavior in Endan-
gered Species Preservation, 72 LAND. ECON. 1, 1 (1996) (“[R]elevant government
agencies face difficult problems of, first, deciding which species to place on the endan-
gered species list and, second, deciding how much to spend on the recovery of each
listed species.”).
74. For example, hunters might encourage translocations of large prey, such as
bighorn sheep or foxes, with the goal of population recovery for future hunting. In
Gibbs v. Babbit, the court held that one reason that endangered, translocated red
wolves were related to interstate commerce was their potential to recover to the point
that they could be hunted and their pelts traded or sold. 214 F.3d 483, 492–93 (4th Cir.
2000).
75. Legal pressure refers to suits brought by environmental nongovernmental or-
ganizations to force agency action to undertake recovery efforts.
76. See infra Appendix I.
77. See infra Appendix I.
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FIGURE 1
Non-Fish and Wildlife Service Actors Number of Decisions
City, state, foreign, or tribal government 5
Agency other than the Fish and Wildlife Service 2
Commercial or industrial interest 4
Environmental nongovernmental organization 19
Zoo 6
Botanical garden and organizing bodies 4
Sportsman group 1
Collaborating enables the Agency to: (1) generate additional
resources; (2) reduce litigation risk; (3) insulate its actions from
political change; (4) shield its actions from oppositional actors; and (5)
encourage experimentation. Each of these factors is discussed below.
FIGURE 2
FWS Incentives to Outsource
Translocation Activities to Example
External Actors
Generate additional resources Wild Sheep Foundation providing $4 million to
fund grazing rights buyouts for domestic sheep
spreading disease to translocated bighorn sheep.
Reduce litigation risk The Nature Conservancy purchasing land to
avoid landowner opposition in recipient areas.
Insulate from political change Zoos and botanical gardens housing captive
populations of endangered plants and animals.
Shield from oppositional actors Tohono O’odham Nation exercising tribal
sovereignty regarding public disclosure
requirements on species habitat to protect
jaguars.
Encourage experimentation Center for Plant Conservation promulgating a
private governance regime and best practices for
conservation by dissemination techniques.
First, the FWS is generating resources to facilitate translocations by
outsourcing. Outsourcing allows the Agency to receive financial
support, scientific expertise, and manpower in addition to that which
is available through public funds. Engaging external actors enables
greater progress toward species recovery than unilateral action by the
FWS. For example, the Utah Wild Sheep Foundation and the Nevada
Wildlife Agency have spent millions of dollars facilitating bighorn
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-1\TWL110.txt unknown Seq: 18 14-DEC-18 14:39
246 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
sheep translocations.78 In a long, involved translocation process,
bighorn sheep were airlifted to their new habitats.
Several translocated sheep died from diseases caught from
intermingling with domesticated sheep populations grazing in the
area. To minimize the risk of disease transfer between domestic and
wild sheep, the Utah chapter of the Wild Sheep Foundation spent $4
million buying out grazing rights on publicly owned land.79 In
exchange for cash buyouts, sheep farmers could either graze cattle
instead of sheep or retire grazing rights entirely. But for the quick and
considerable support of external actors, the translocation may have
failed because of the spread of unanticipated disease. In this sense,
outsourcing translocation activity is a success in the well-supported
public goal of preventing extinction of endangered species.80
Second, outsourcing enables the FWS to sidestep controversial
portions of translocations, presumably reducing litigation risk. Private
landowner opposition to a variety of species recovery actions is widely
documented.81 Landowners in recipient areas82 believe themselves to
be disproportionately burdened83 by translocations,84 which are




80. Later discussion indicates that individual species recovery may be the wrong
metric for measuring the success of translocation activity.
81. This is, admittedly, an oversimplification as landowners hold diverse
preferences for the existence of endangered species on their land. A nature
conservancy group or recreational landowner, for example, would likely welcome
some endangered species, whereas industrial land users like mining or timber
companies would likely not. As a general matter, literature focuses on landowners’
attempts to resist the listing and relocation of endangered species onto privately-held
land because of perceptions of increased liability, decreased land value, and increased
scrutiny by federal wildlife management agencies of land management decisions. See,
e.g., Bork, supra note 67, at 183–84 (describing translocations as burdensome for
landowners in the recipient area, into which the endangered species are placed).
Translocation’s redistributive effects are not unique; virtually all environmental
protection laws are redistributive in nature. Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of
“Republican Moment” in Environmental Law, 87 MINN. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2003)
(“Environmental protection laws are invariably redistributive; they impose substantial
costs on some and confer substantial benefits on others.”).
82. Of course, the Endangered Species Act is not unique in producing public
goods with localized harms. A similar dynamic emerges in NIMBY opposition to land
use decisions, in which socially-necessary facilities—such as hospitals—are unpopular
wherever they land. See, e.g., Michael Wheeler, Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from
the Failure of Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE J. REG. 241, 275 (1994).
83. Salzman, supra note 54, at 340 (noting that communities and landowners near
areas designated as critical habitat believe they bear a disproportionate burden of the
cost for the societal good of species preservation).
84. Translocations essentially create new populations of endangered species in
areas where they did not immediately exist before. Thus, translocations are roughly
analogous to the decision to list a species because an area that previously did not face
species-specific restrictions now will.
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perceived as imposing localized costs,85 including: loss of control over
private land,86 increased scrutiny of industrial land uses,87 liability for
unintentionally taking endangered species,88 and diminished property
values.89 Landowner opposition increases when predatory species,
such as wolves, are translocated near the landowners’ property.90
To avoid perceived harms, landowners in recipient areas may
organize to exert political influence to halt proposed translocations.91
The small size of landowner groups coupled with the large burden that
they stand to suffer causes them to invest heavily in exerting political
pressure to avoid translocations.92 The FWS is loath to invest limited
resources into controversial translocations that are time-consuming
and that divert resources from more effective on-the-ground recovery
85. Holly Doremus, Private Property Interests, Wildlife Restoration and Competing
Visions of a Western Eden, 18 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 41, 45 (1998)
(“[R]eintroduction efforts create or threaten a variety of conflicts with private
property interests.”).
86.  Id.
87. For example, the translocation of endangered species to an area might
threaten industrial interests in the area. When bighorn sheep were reintroduced to
Utah, several died from disease caught from intermingling with domesticated sheep
populations grazing in the area. To minimize the risk of domestic-to-wild disease
transfer, the Utah chapter of the Wild Sheep Foundation purchased grazing rights on
publicly owned land. In exchange for cash buyouts, sheep farmers could either graze
cattle instead of sheep or retire grazing rights entirely. Wild Sheep Foundation has
spent more than $4 million dollars in such buyouts. Yoshida, supra note 78. R
88.  Endangered Species Act: Hearing on Endangered Species Act Reauthorization
and Oversight Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong. 391
(1982) (statement of Patrick A. Parenteau, Vice President for Conservation, Nat’l
Wildlife Fed’n) (noting concern by the state of Arizona that hunters might be “fined
or jailed for accidently shooting the masked bobwhite”); Bork, supra note 67, at 186
(noting that landowners may face liability for unintentionally taking an endangered
species—punishable by criminal and civil penalties—during routine land use
activities).
89. Main et al., supra note 54, at 1265 (“Landowners fear a decline in the value of
their properties because the ESA restricts future land-use options . . .”).
90. Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000). Gibbs v. Babbitt involved a
population of endangered red wolves bred in captivity and released by the Fish and
Wildlife Service onto wildlife refuges in North Carolina and Tennessee. 41 of the 75
wolves released wandered out of the refuges and onto private land. Id. at 488.
Landowner Gibbs sued the Fish and Wildlife Service for the right to exterminate any
wolves found on private land. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
wolves affected interstate commerce and were therefore subject to federal regulation
as administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service. Id. at 497. Accordingly, the court
denied landowners the right to exterminate wolves found on private property, even if
the wolves killed livestock. Id. at 496–98.
91. Industrial land users may be members of preexisting groups, such as
Cattlemen’s Associations or saddle clubs, and thus face few start-up costs when
organizing to oppose translocation. Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck,
Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507 (2015)
(discussing the importance of pre-existing organizations and landowner homogeneity
in influencing resource use—including wildlife management—at the landscape-level).
92. See supra notes 34–46 (discussing the factors that make interest groups
effective at exerting political pressure).
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efforts.93 Outsourcing translocation efforts provides the Agency with
the opportunity to avoid legal controversy while still undertaking the
translocation, by buying out the interests that give rise to intensely
concentrated groups of landowners opposing translocations.
For example, The Nature Conservancy was the environmental
nongovernmental organization most frequently incorporated into
translocation actions in recovery plans. The Nature Conservancy
purchases private land for conservation activity.94 By purchasing land
for translocations, rather than locating species on or near privately
held lands, the FWS can sidestep landowner opposition. Further,
having an environmental nongovernmental organization funding the
purchase and managing the land conserves the FWS’s resources.
Third, the FWS outsources to protect vulnerable species against
fluctuating levels of political support. The FWS operates at the whim
of changing political priorities and budgetary decisions.95
Environmental nongovernmental organizations, including botanical
gardens and zoos, are relatively removed from cyclical political
change.96 These ideologically aligned nongovernmental organizations
may be able to protect species against the political pressures that can
undermine long-term recovery efforts.
For example, zoos and botanical gardens house captive populations
of endangered plants and animals.97 In several cases, the only
93. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Institutional Challenges of New Age Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50,
62 (noting that the Fish and Wildlife Service “seek[s] out any flexibility the statute
allows, and exploit[s] it to deflect controversy”); Holly Doremus, The Endangered
Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 175, 230
(2010); (noting that implementation of the Endangered Species Act “has been a story
of political compromise and accommodation of development interests, with only
scattered sightings of an administrative spine.”).
94. About Us, NATURE CONSERVANCY, https://www.nature.org/about-us/private-
lands-conservation/index.htm [https://perma.cc/KU8W-DEYD].
95. Economist Amy Whritenour Ando has demonstrated that interest groups
affect the endangered species listing process through comments, petitions, and via the
influence of Congressmen. Ando, supra note 57, at 30 (“Interest groups have a variety
of tools at their disposal with which to affect the administrative process; they can act
directly with petitions or comments or work indirectly through the influence of
important members of Congress.”); R. Patrick Rawls and David Laband demonstrate
a relationship between a state’s political muscle and the number of endangered
species listings that occurred within that state. Rawls & Laband, supra note 56, at 263
(finding a correlation between state representation on the House of Representatives
budget subcommittee—which provides oversight for the funding of the Fish and
Wildlife Service—and the number of endangered species listings that occur within
that state).
96. They are of course, subject to other and indirect political pressures with
attendant budgetary effects.
97. For an interesting and detailed discussion of the role of zoos in conservation of
threatened and endangered species, see IRUS BRAVERMAN, ZOOLAND: THE
INSTITUTION OF CAPTIVITY 5–6, 14 (2013) (discussing zoos re-envisioning themselves
as conservation organizations through a variety of activities, including captive
breeding of endangered species).
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remaining populations of a species are kept in captivity by zoos or
botanical gardens. But for the role of these external actors, changing
political whims might spell the doom of a species. This is not a
hypothetical scenario: government officials exterminated hundreds of
threatened desert tortoises because of funding shortages.98 Housing
fragile populations of species with well-funded nongovernmental
organizations reduces the likelihood that, over a period of decades,
changing political or fiscal climates will undermine species survival.
Captive breeding populations are crucial to some translocation efforts,
which release captive-bred animals to the wild.
Fourth, Agency officials use relational contracting to avoid
opposition and controversy that would otherwise derail translocations.
It is well-documented that some landowners seek to destroy natural
places where endangered species live to avoid listing and critical
habitat designations.99 Individuals who are ideologically opposed to
the Act may even kill endangered species to undermine translocation
efforts.100 Plants and corals, which are immobile and often live in
isolated locations, are especially vulnerable to intentional destruction.
However, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requires the
Agency to publicly release information on the habitat and location of
endangered species.101
The FWS officials may be circumventing FOIA requirements by
cooperating with Native American tribes to conceal the location of
particularly vulnerable endangered species. Tribes are not subject to
FOIA requirements and thus are not required to publicly release
information about endangered species located on tribal lands.
Accordingly, recent scholarship suggests that FWS officials are
cooperating with tribal governments’ refusal to publicly state whether
98. Hannah Dreier, Associated Press, Desert Tortoise Faces Threat from
Conservation Center, DESERT NEWS (Aug. 25, 2013), https://www.deseretnews.com/
article/765636588/Desert-tortoise-faces-threat-from-its-own-refuge.html [https://
perma.cc/X7GY-Q37B].
99. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion
Over Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 506 (2008) (suggesting that “[t]here is
considerable anecdotal and empirical evidence that private landowners preemptively
destroy the habitat of imperiled species . . .”). Localized resistance to listing
endangered species and designating critical habitat is well-documented. Daowei
Zhang, Endangered Species and Timber Harvesting: The Case of Red-Cockaded
Woodpeckers, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 150, 162–163 (2004) (reporting results of an
empirical studying showing that landowners reduce endangered species habitat, and
encourage their neighbors to do the same, before critical habitat designation to
protect and enhance their property values).
100. A person who killed, skinned, and decapitated a translocated wolf in
Yellowstone National Park wore a tee-shirt reading “wild wolf reduction.” See United
States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Jonathan H. Adler,
Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of Uncompensated
Land-Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 320–31 (2008).
101. Kevin R. Kemper, Environmental Information Policy and Secrets About
Jaguars: Why Trusting Arizona Tribes Is the Best Strategy for Jaguar Protection, 4
ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 187, 196 (2014).
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particularly fragile endangered species exist on their lands.102 Tribes’
ability to conceal the location of translocated animals may provide
one reason why the FWS sometimes yields its planned translocation
efforts to allow tribes to undertake translocations.
The jaguar provides a particularly compelling example of such
shielding. The jaguar’s indigenous range includes Southern Arizona,
although the majority of the population resides in Northern
Mexico.103 Three times within the past fifteen years, jaguars have
appeared in Arizona.104 A Pulitzer-prize winning journalistic
investigation traced Arizona State Game and Fish officials as they
tracked, trapped, collared, and ultimately euthanized a jaguar in
1997.105 When a new jaguar appeared in Southern Arizona in 2000,
FWS officials were concerned about attempts to harm the animal.106
The FWS has outsourced some level of protection to the Tohono
O’odham Nation, which has lands intersecting with a jaguar habitat.107
At least one legal commentator suggests that the tribe is using its
sovereignty to protect information about the jaguar and other
endangered species.108
Fifth, the collaboration facilitated by relational contracting enables
low-cost experimentation in translocation techniques. For example,
botanical gardens are spearheading the innovative translocation
technique of conservation by dissemination, in which desirable plant
species are sold to private gardeners to propagate in biologically
suitable locations.109 Conservation by dissemination is a scientifically
uncertain practice.110 Translocation locations may prove inappropriate
if translocated species are invasive or undermine indigenous species.
The practice also raises ethical questions surrounding the
commodification of endangered species and distributional effects of
outsourcing.111
102. Id.
103. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Extend
Endangered Status for the Jaguar in the United States, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,147
(July 22, 1997) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
104. Kemper, supra note 101.
105. Dennis Wagner, Web of Intrigue Surrounds Death of Jaguar Macho B, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC (Dec. 12, 2012, 10:20 AM), https://archive.azcentral.com/news/articles/
20121215macho-b-death-jaguar-mystery.html [https://perma.cc/TY2X-BCE6].
106. Kemper, supra note 101.
107. Id. at 191, 193–194 (“Because the federal and state governments say little
about their ongoing work with tribes, the public was left to guess . . . the tribes would
have much to say about jaguars, but their actions and positions are usually not known
publicly.”).
108. Id. at 191 (noting that “the historical record shows that other tribes like the
White Mountain Apache Tribe have set strict boundaries about information flow with
the federal government because of past abuses . . .”).
109. Tyna Yost, Dissertation (on file with Author).
110. Id.
111. William H. Allen, Reintroduction of Endangered Species, BIOSCIENCE, Feb.
1994, at, 65, 65–68 (describing plant biologists’ mixed feelings towards endangered
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By outsourcing responsibility for conservation by dissemination to
botanical gardens, the FWS sidesteps responsibility for translocation
mistakes and avoids taking a public stand on the ethical and scientific
questions at issue. Instead, a private regulatory regime—the Center
for Plant Conservation, an association of botanical gardens—governs
the practice. Thus, the Agency is allowing experimentation in this
innovative technique without going through the costly and time-
consuming practice of seeking explicit congressional permission or
undergoing rulemaking procedures. Nevertheless, the Agency retains
loose control over botanical gardens should the botanical gardens
undertake irresponsible translocation practices through the
enforcement provisions of the ESA. Thus, outsourcing enables the
Agency to inexpensively experiment with new translocation
techniques.
Despite the largely private nature of the translocations, the FWS is
playing a central, crucial role in translocation activities. Perhaps most
importantly, it provides a vital check against illicit, illegal, or unwise
translocations.112 Although the Agency may choose not to exert its
authority to halt translocations that may technically violate Section
10(j) of the Act, the threat of using that authority for criminal
enforcement provides a vital check on private activity. FWS agents
provide an important role in networking, advice, and scientific
expertise. The FWS is an identifiable, central source of authority—a
clearinghouse through which all legitimate translocations pass.
Through collaboration with private groups, the FWS maintains
control over private translocations while expanding its ability to
achieve its objective. Private action allows a level of speed, flexibility,
and resource allocation that simply would not be possible if the
Agency exerted exclusive control over translocations. Given the
immediacy of the threat of extinction due to climate change, these
factors arguably suggest that the FWS is doing much better at
satisfying its mission as a facilitator of private activity than as an
exclusive administer of translocations. What the Agency loses in direct
control over translocation, it gains in efficiency in satisfying its
mandate.
It appears as though the FWS may be avoiding the costliness and
political infeasibility of directly undertaking translocations. Instead,
the Agency has shifted its efforts towards facilitating and monitoring
translocation efforts by other groups. Thus, an agency that could be
plant translocation innovations being used to facilitate land development destroying
the indigenous habitat of some plant species).
112. Jason S. McLachlan et al., A Framework for Debate of Assisted Migration in an
Era of Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 297, 299 (2007) (“Maverick,
unsupervised translocation efforts run the risk of undermining current conservation
work and do not reflect a consensus among interested parties.”).
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cast as obsolete in the light of private action is in fact satisfying its
mandate by permitting, facilitating, and monitoring private action.
The political economy of translocations renders the FWS unable to
complete translocations at the rate necessary to satisfy its statutory
mandate of preventing species extinction. Despite Agency inaction,
translocations are occurring at a rapid pace thanks to private action.
The FWS has largely outsourced the task of translocating species to
outside groups.113 Because the Agency lacks the capacity to
unilaterally satisfy its mandate through mass translocations, it has
leveraged other actors to prevent extinction and thus satisfy its
statutory mandate.
Hundreds of endangered species translocations are taking place
annually,114 staving off extinction. Private groups are facilitating the
translocations, including: environmental nongovernmental
organizations, commercial timber harvesters, sportsman’s groups,
tribal governments, agencies not officially tasked with wildlife
conservations, and even foreign governments. Private contributions to
developing translocation practices include promulgations of policies
and standards, provision of scientific expertise, funding to facilitate
translocations, availability of secrecy unavailable to the FWS’s
activities, and on-the-ground manpower to undertake trans-
locations.115
113. Species translocation is one of several ways in which the Fish and Wildlife
Service has partnered with external actors to further its administration of the
Endangered Species Act. Other examples of public-private action include the Section
4 listing process and Section 10 Habitat Conservation Plan process, in which private
and municipal actors provide private funding of recovery efforts in exchange for
Incidental Take Permits. For an overview of these actions, see Federico Cheever, The
Prohibition Against Taking Endangered Wildlife in Section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973: The Existence of Exceptions Supports Full Enforcement, Nat. Res.
L. Ctr. Occasional Paper, Univ. of Colo. (1990).
114. Exact estimates are not available due to inadequate record-keeping practices.
See J. Fischer & D.B. Lindenmayer, An Assessment of the Published Results of Animal
Relocations, 96 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 1, 8–9 (2000).
115. The International Union for Conservation of Nature, an international
environmental nongovernmental organization, has issued non-binding international
guidelines for species translocation decisions. IUCN SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM’N
GUIDELINES FOR REINTRODUCTIONS AND OTHER CONSERVATION TRANSLOCATIONS
(2012), http://www.issg.org/pdf/publications/Translocation-Guidelines-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LC5S-76WV]; see also BEYOND CAPTIVE BREEDING: RE-
INTRODUCING ENDANGERED MAMMALS TO THE WILD (J.H.W. Gipps ed., 1991)
(presenting an edited collection of important papers on reintroduction); Suzanne R.
Jones, Overview of the Goals and Activities of the IUCN Captive Breeding Specialist
Group and International Species Information System, 8 ENDANGERED SPECIES
UPDATE 8 (1990); Guidelines for Reintroduction of Animals Born or Held in Captivity,
ASS’N ZOOS & AQUARIUMS (1992), https://www.aza.org/reintroduction-scientific-
advisory-group [https://perma.cc/9USZ-HRJR] (outlining nineteen guidelines
governing zoo reintroductions). For an example of one technique used for domestic
translocation decisions that relies upon software-based decision-making, see Bork,
supra note 67, at 183–85 (describing translocations as burdensome for landowners in R
recipient areas); Jill S. Heaton et al., Spatially Explicit Decision Support for Selecting
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IV. ANALYZING RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Is relational contracting and the collaborations it gives rise to a
good thing? Agencies embedding private commitments into planning
documents provide a vital tool for resolving the inherent tension be-
tween federal environmental objectives and the private action re-
quired to achieve those goals. It may also serve to mitigate federalism
concerns by incorporating local priorities and information into the
federal decision-making process. This technique has become particu-
larly relevant as a bi-partisan technique in an era of political
polarization.
Because hundreds of translocations take place annually, monies are
being generated to fund projects, and best practices in relocation poli-
cies are fully formed and usually followed.116 These concerns extend
beyond fairness to substantive effects: embedding private actions lim-
its expression of the preference heterogeneity that would be available
by including more diverse stakeholder perspectives.117 Aggregating in-
formation from diverse stakeholders provides benefits like the wis-
dom of crowds, whereas relying upon particularized groups risks
losing benefits.118 Some stakeholders are granted a direct role in influ-
encing outcomes, while others are excluded from decision-making and
implementation entirely. This presents a complex set of distributional
issues, which vary according to the mandate and agency at issue.
It is neither clear nor predictable which stakeholder groups will em-
bed commitments into agency planning documents. The FWS case
study showed an agency allocating translocation responsibility across a
variety of groups with diverse interests; for example, both sportsmen’s
groups and conservation groups received implicit agency permission
to participate in the translocation of species. The FWS appears genu-
inely committed to the objective of saving animals. In other contexts,
Translocation Areas for Mojave Desert Tortoises, 17 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION
575, 576–79 (2008) (listing ten objective criteria for determining where to translocate
2,000 desert tortoises displaced by a proposed military facility, but acknowledging that
the decision tool ignored the political and social aspects of the decision); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49
STAN. L. REV. 305, 315 (1997) (noting the difficulties landowners face in
accommodating endangered species recovery efforts).
116. Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species, supra note 67, at 7–8 (“Today gov- R
ernments, nonprofit organizations, and individuals carry out many hundred deliberate
wildlife translocations each year in North America.”); see also id. at 9 (describing
public and private funding sources).
117. Stephenson, supra note 27, at 1472 (“The fact that information acquisition is R
often endogenous may supply another perspective on the differences between the
behaviors of ideologically diverse and ideologically homogeneous groups, as well as
another tentative reason to favor diversity—particularly in the form of including the
representation of minority views—in collective decision-making.”).
118. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (2005); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 124–66 (1999).
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however, the picture is murkier. Less even-handed policies develop, as
the same type of actors will repeatedly be granted outsourced portions
of mandates, while others are systemically excluded.119
Distributional inequities in planning are exacerbated by the relative
inaccessibility of judicial review for outsourced actions. Unlike the
more formalized processes underlying traditional agency proce-
dures—as with the exhaustive records necessary for rulemaking
processes—the existence and availability of agency recordkeeping of
privatized action are sorely lacking (and possibly intentionally so).120
Excluded stakeholders may have trouble challenging their lack of par-
ticipation in court since they may not even be aware of the decisions
being made that affect them.121 Even if they bring litigation, judges
will have difficulty assessing the extent to which privatization is occur-
ring because of a lack of centralized recordkeeping. Thus, the scope of
outsourcing is largely unknown to courts, making it virtually impossi-
ble for judges to assess its harms to stakeholder groups who litigate
agency action.
When agencies partner with private actors to contract, excluded
stakeholders lose the benefit of participating in influencing agency ac-
tion. Emerging trends in litigation indicate that excluded stakeholders
are demanding a seat at the table in agency actions.122 One strand of
emerging litigation challenges the EPA’s administration of the Clean
Air Act. The EPA has relied upon agencies working with environmen-
tal nongovernmental organizations in sue-and-settle litigation.123
119. This appears to be the case with Zachary Gubler’s discussion of the Security
and Exchange Commission private offerings, in which companies seeking to go public
are the recipients of agency privatization whereas investors never are. See generally
Zachary J. Gubler, Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L.
REV. 745 (2013) (describing how the Security and Exchange Commission allows pri-
vate funding of initial public offerings).
120. For a discussion of poor recordkeeping practices regarding conservation ease-
ments, see generally Jessica Owley, Keeping Track of Conservation, 42 ECOLOGY L.Q.
79 (2015).
121. For a discussion of how federal agencies interact with states without meaning-
ful access to courts or judicial precedent in the cooperative federalism arena of the
EPA Petition-to-Withdraw Process, see Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Ad-
ministrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2013).
122. This concern is reflective of a broader trend of the public grappling with pri-
vate governance in environmental law. Federico Cheever notes: “as the nation (and
the globe) become covered with a patchwork of privately managed biodiversity pre-
serves containing publicly protected species we will see a series of new problems gen-
erated by interest groups interested in developing privately preserved land and
government agencies uncomfortable with having such an obviously public resource
managed largely in private hands.” E-mail from Federico Cheever, Professor of Law,
Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law, to Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Assoc. Professor of
Law, Ariz. State Univ. Sandra Day O’Connor Coll. of Law (May 14, 2015) (on file
with Author).
123. Henry N. Butler & Nathaniel J. Harris, Sue, Settle, and Shut out the States:
Destroying the Environmental Benefits of Cooperative Federalism, 37 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 579, 580–83 (2014).
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States and industries are challenging the consent decrees that emerge
from the agreements between agencies and environmental nongovern-
mental organizations. States argue that substantive outcomes are de-
termined in bilateral settlement agreements to the exclusion of state
participation, which violates the cooperative federalism model at the
core of the Clean Air Act. In other words, states protest an agency’s
avoidance of direct engagement with states through collaboration with
environmental nongovernmental organizations. The challenges are
well-funded and well-publicized: Oklahoma’s Attorney General
penned an editorial in the Washington Examiner highlighting the prac-
tice.124 This case is currently up on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.125
Cast more broadly, sue-and-settle litigation reflects larger concerns
that agencies cooperate with one type of stakeholder to the exclusion
of others. This is a familiar refrain in a variety of arenas, ranging from
the consent decrees in natural resource damage claims (in which agen-
cies cooperate with polluters) to ESA listings litigation (in which
agencies cooperate with environmental nongovernmental organiza-
tions). Clean Act Air litigation may be the first in a string of lawsuits
challenging agencies’ bilateral cooperation with a single stakeholder
group to the exclusion of other actors. If so, the often-practiced and
little-discussed agency adaptation of outsourcing public mandates will
be subject to heighted judicial scrutiny.126
Even more broadly, public-private collaborations and contractual
agreements function at least partially through exclusion. We readily
accept such exclusion in relational contracting arrangements among
private parties. Agency action, in contrast, demands much higher scru-
tiny about the potential exclusionary effects of contractual arrange-
ments. This is a bi-partisan concern, and this Article has outlined
examples of excluded parties falling upon both sides of ideological
lines. Additional scholarly thought is needed to identify, explore, and
address the undertheorized issue that exclusion is a necessary precur-
sor to collaborative agreements, like the relational contracts explored
herein.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article documents agencies’ use of planning documents to co-
ordinate external actors’ participation in substantive environmental
124. Scott Pruitt, Opinion, ‘Sue and Settle’ Deals Are Regulation-by-Consent-De-
cree, WASH. EXAMINER (May 15, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.
com/sue-and-settle -deals-are-regulation-by-consent-decree [https://perma.cc/9SGA-
WTQG].
125. See Sierra Club v. McCarthy, No. 13-cv-03953-SI, 2015 WL 889142 (N.D. Cal.
March 2, 2015), aff’d, 868 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2017) for an order granting consent
decree entered into by nongovernmental organizations and the EPA, over objections
brought by a coalition of states.
126. For a discussion of this concern, see supra Part III.
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goals. Recovery planning as required by the ESA provides one such
example of contracting the facilitation and coordination of private ac-
tion. This case study illustrates the mix of benefits and harms that
emerge from this practice, which is then used as a framework for con-
sidering the potential expansion of relational contracting as a tech-
nique to address climate change response.
While coordination of external private actors is an effective way to
achieve results, it comes with the drawback that agencies may favor
certain stakeholders and exclude others. The administrative state was
designed with procedural mechanisms that were intended to ensure
agency expertise is coupled with public participation to produce good
policy. Thus, relational contracting between agencies and private ac-
tors is an important tool that must be carefully administered with an
eye toward the overall goal of creating good policy.
VI. APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY
The Endangered Species Act requires the FWS to develop a recov-
ery plan for each species listed as either threatened or endangered.
The recovery plan database is the most complete source of record-
keeping about the FWS’s administration of the Act. I led a team of
research assistants in reviewing this database with a focus on the spe-
cific recovery action of species translocation.
Within the recovery plan database, research assistants searched for
terms under the umbrella of translocation drawn from scientific jour-
nals, including: “translocation”; “relocation”; “reintroduction”; “as-
sisted colonization”; and “assisted migration.” These terms produced
results indicating that translocations—under a variety of terms—were
incorporated into 138 single species recovery plans and plan ad-
dendums.127 To validate the accuracy of the database search, research
assistants verified that each of the recovery plans deemed transloca-
tion ecologically necessary for species recovery.128
The team drew various elements of analysis—such as terminology
describing non-Agency actors—from a variety of documents in the re-
covery plan database for each species. The FWS is required to update
the recovery plan for each species every five years to reflect new in-
formation. Research assistants culled the updated documents on a
species-by-species analysis.
Notably, the analysis is limited to reporting the data from the
database. I do not test the causal sources driving the outcomes re-
ported using econometric approaches, such as multivariable analysis.
127. These terms also produced 47 multispecies recovery plans and 16 duplicative
recovery plans, both of which are omitted from this analysis.
128. Research assistants notated the document name, year, page number, and lan-
guage deeming recovery ecologically necessary.
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As such, the findings do not account for variables that may be explan-
atory but differ from public choice predictions.
In this Appendix, I specifically explore the FWS’s use of embedding
private commitments into statutorily-required recovery plan docu-
ments as a mechanism to achieve species translocations. It demon-
strates that FWS is using recovery planning as a tool to gauge
potential opposition and marshal private environmental action.
As noted above, FWS has prepared a total of 597 recovery plans for
endangered and threatened species. Species translocation is included
in the plan for 138 species, or 22% of listed species. Roughly half of
the planned translocations have, in fact, occurred. This is unsurprising
as recovery plans are guidance documents, which cannot be judicially
enforced, and thus likely include several objectives that are not car-
ried out.
The FWS identified translocation as an ecologically necessary re-
covery strategy for 138 threatened or endangered species. This repre-
sents 22% of all 597 recovery plans. Of the 138 proposed
translocations, sixty-five translocations have occurred. Seventy pro-
posed translocations have not occurred. In three instances, it is un-
clear whether the translocation occurred. Figure 3 reflects this data.
FIGURE 3
Translocation Status Number Percentage
Not completed 70 51%
Completed 65 47%
Indeterminate 3 2%
Groups other than the FWS are involved with seventeen of the
sixty-five translocations that have occurred and twenty-six of the
seventy proposed translocations that have not occurred. Non-Agency
actors include tribes, states, cities, sportsmen’s groups, business
interests, botanical gardens, zoos, and environmental non-
governmental organizations.
Notably, forty-seven of the seventy translocations not completed
provide vague or incomplete information about translocation status.
Seventeen plans simply state that translocation has “not started” with
no additional explanation for why the translocation had not begun.
Similarly, thirty plans suggest planned future action with varying
degrees of specificity about when and how the recovery will occur in
the future. Four plans suggest that there is a scientific rationale for not
completing recovery, including uncertainty about the effects of
translocation. In two instances, subsequent plan reviews deem
translocation unnecessary because the species has shown recovery.
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Additionally, in five cases, the species declined to the point that there
are too few species to transplant.
In one case, the Agency declined to translocate a species because a
tribe planned to do so, which is a clear case of the Agency deferring to
non-Agency action. In another instance, the FWS did not translocate
because of low levels of landowner participation in transplanting the
Western Lily on private land. Commentators have noted in the past
that the FWS hides behind ecological rationale and scientific
uncertainty to justify inaction caused by interest group pressures.129
Most rationales offered do not provide sufficient information to assess
whether the Agency decision not to complete translocation accorded
with the Agency’s recovery mandate, as reflected in Figure 4 below.
FIGURE 4
Rationale Provided for Number of Translocation
Uncompleted Translocations Decisions
“Not started” with no rationale
17
offered
Planned in future 30
Scientific rationale for status,
4
including uncertainty
Unnecessary because of species
2
recovery






Interest group pressure prevents
1
translocation
As discussed above, agencies can use relational contracting in order
to pursue policy goals. This research illustrates how the FWS has used
relational contracting to administer recovery planning and species
translocation under the ESA. It demonstrates that FWS is managing
species translocation by coordinating with private actors to develop
recovery plan documents.
129. Doremus, Adaptive Management, supra note 72, at 1462–63 (noting that
scientific uncertainty gives managers an excuse to be passive at the risk of systemically
under-protecting environmental values and bowing to political and economic
pressures).
